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OPTIMAL COORDINATION POLICY FOR SUPPLY
CHAIN SYSTEM UNDER IMPERFECT QUALITY
CONSIDERATION
Tien-Yu Lin* and Din-Horng Yeh**
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ABSTRACT
We considered a simple single-vendor, single-buyer supply
chain system, in which the buyer’s ordering lead time is affected by purchasing price discounts which in turn are affected
by the vendor’s pricing policy. Both parties in the supply
chain system have conflicting goals: the buyer wants to
minimize his total cost while the vendor aims to maximize his
total profit. In order to guarantee the mutual interest of both
parties, we have developed a mathematical model to illustrate
how the best supply chain system benefit can be achieved
through coordinating the buyer’s ordering lead time and the
vendor’s pricing policy. For practical purposes, risk costs and
the effect of imperfect quality are also included in the model.
A numerical example and related sensitivity analysis are given
to show the effectiveness of the proposed model.

I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of coordination in supply chain management
(SCM) has received considerable attention from academic
researchers and practitioners. Traditionally, both vendors and
buyers in the supply chain system make decisions in search of
their individual benefits. However, many researchers (e.g. [32,
35, 41, 46], etc.) have pointed out that coordination between
both parties is important in order to gain competitive advantages through cost reduction. The importance of coordination
is further increased because vendors and buyers frequently
implement the just-in-time (JIT) concept in their own systems.
A recent study pointed out that coordination is crucial to successful JIT implementation for both parties [17]. A key technique in successful SCM is JIT application to multiple deliv-
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eries. Chung and Wee [7] showed that increases in quality,
productivity, and efficiency can be achieved through JIT delivery agreements. A recent study showed that if a long-term
relationship has been established, both parties in the supply
chain system can achieve further improved benefits through
cooperation and information sharing [5]. Rau and OuYang
[36] presented a new integrated production-inventory policy
that showed that the performance of integrated consideration
is better than the performance of any independent decision
from either the buyer or the vendor.
Goyal [10] was among the first researchers focusing on the
joint economic lot size (JELS) problem in the supply chain
system, in which an integrated inventory model was developed assuming the vendor’s production rate was infinite.
Banerjee [2] generalized Goyal’s model so that the vendor
produced to the buyer’s order on a lot-for-lot shipment policy.
Later, Goyal [11] relaxed the lot-for-lot shipment assumption
and proposed a more general JELS model that provided a
lower-joint total relevant cost, in which he suggested that the
vendor’s economic production quantity (EPQ) should be an
integer multiple of the buyer’s purchase quantity. Landeros
and Lyth [20] generalized these models by incorporating the
fixed shipment cost associated with each delivery to the buyer.
Recently, Goyal [12] and Hill [14] proposed different shipment policies and suggested that each shipment size should be
determined by the first shipment size and rate of production/demand. As shown by Viswanathan [43], neither a policy
with equal-sized sub-batches nor a policy with unequal-sized
sub-batches dominated the other. Ertogral et al. [8] further
analyzed the vendor-buyer lot-sizing problem under equalsize shipment policy, in which they incorporated transportation costs explicitly into the model and developed optimal
solution procedures for solving the integrated models. More
recently, Ben-Daya et al. [3] presented a comprehensive and
up-to-date review of the joint economic lot sizing problem and
also provided some extensions of this important problem. To
simplify analysis, many researchers discuss the supply chain
system with a single-vendor and single-buyer.
A globally optimal batching and shipment policy for a
two-echelon supply chain with single-vendor and single-buyer
was established by Hill [15], in which he pointed out that the
successive shipment size of the first m shipments using a fixed
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factor. Hoque and Goyal [16] suggested an optimal procedure
for a single-vendor and single-buyer production-inventory
problem with equal-sized and unequal-sized shipments, in
which a transportation equipment capacity constraint was
included. Pan and Yang [29] proposed an integrated inventory
model with controllable lead time, and later Chang et al. [5]
extended their model to an integrated cooperative inventory
model with controllable lead time and ordering cost reduction.
Further, Huang [17] developed an optimal policy for a single-vendor and single-buyer integrated production-inventory
problem with process unreliability consideration. More recently, Chen and Kang [6] developed integrated vendor-buyer
cooperative inventory models with the permissible delay in
payments to determine the optimal replenishment time interval
and replenishment frequency.
In practice it quite often occurs that inventory management
is affected by imperfect product quality. Porteus [34] integrated the effect of imperfect items into the basic EOQ model,
in which he used the simple model to illustrate the relationship
between quality and lot size. Rosenblatt and Lee [38] assumed
that defective items could be reworked instantly at a cost and
they found that the presence of defective products motivated
smaller lot sizes. Later, Schwaller [42] assumed that defective
items were present in incoming lots and the inspection costs
should be incurred in finding and removing such items. An
EOQ-based model with demand-dependent unit production
cost and imperfect production processes was proposed by
Gerchak [9], in which he formulated the inventory decision
problem as a geometric program that was solved to obtain
optimal solutions. Salameh and Jaber [40] also developed an
EOQ-based model for items received with imperfect quality,
in which they assumed that the defective quantities could be
sold as a single batch by the end of 100% screening process.
They found that the economic lot size increased as the average
percentage of flawed quality items increased. Goyal and
Cardenas-Baeeon [13] proposed a simple method for determining the EPQ for an item with imperfect quality. Recently,
Huang [17] developed a model to determine an optimal integrated vendor-buyer inventory policy for imperfect items in
JIT environment. Papachristos and Konstantaras [31] focused
on the issue of no shortages in EOQ-based models with proportional flawed quality, in which the proportion of the imperfects was assumed to be a random variable. More recently,
Wee et al. [45] developed an optimal inventory model for
items with imperfect quality and shortage backordering in
which the optimum operating inventory strategy was obtained
by trading off the total revenues per unit time. Furthermore,
Maddah and Jaber [23] developed an EOQ-based model with
unreliable supply, characterized by a random fraction of imperfect quality items and a screening process. They rectified a
flaw developed by Salameh and Jaber [40].
According to Chang et al. [5], controllable lead time and
ordering cost reduction were keys to business success. Liao
and Shyu [22] were among the first to develop a probabilistic
inventory model in which lead time was a unique variable and

order quantity was predetermined. Ben-Daya and Raouf [4]
integrated the lead time and ordering quantity as decision
variables in which shortages were not permitted. Recently,
Ouyang et al. [27] investigated the impact of investing in
quality improvement and lead time reduction on the integrated
vendor-buyer inventory model with partial backorders. Chang
et al. [5] assumed buyer’s lead time can be shortened at an
extra crash cost that depended on the lead time and the ordering lot size. The buyer’s ordering cost could be reduced
through further investment. More recently, Zhao et al. [47]
developed an analytical model to quantify the cost savings of
an early order commitment in a two-level supply chain where
demand was serially correlated, and they pointed out that the
supply chain would experience greater savings from early
order commitment.
Recent operations management literature began to focus on
developing integrated models that can simultaneously optimize the relevant inventory (operations) and pricing (marketing) decisions [39]. A literature review on pricing and
ordering policies for manufacturer–retailer supply chains was
made by Khouja [18]. In the meantime, Petruzzi and Dada [33]
also made a review with extensions on pricing and the newsvendor problem. Mantrala and Raman [24] further investigated the effect of the retailer’s optimal ordering quantity
decisions under demand uncertainty. Lau and Lau [21] developed a joint pricing–inventory model and they found that
different demand functions could lead to very different results
in a multi-echelon system. Later, Viswanathan and Wang [44]
developed a simple vendor-retailer supply chain model in
which the retailer faces a price-sensitive deterministic demand.
Ray et al. [37] further introduced an integrated marketinginventory model for two pricing policies in which they considered price as a decision variable using mark-up pricing.
More recently, Bakal et al. [1] presented two inventory models
with price-sensitive demand and they investigated two different pricing strategies. Pan et al. [30] further constructed a
two-period model to discuss pricing and ordering problems for
a dominant retailer under a two-echelon supply chain.
Although supply chain system coordination has received
considerable attention, the effect of ordering lead time is neglected by most researchers. In practice, it is often the case
that the vendor benefits if the buyer places its orders earlier.
The reason is that if the buyer’s ordering lead time is long, the
vendor may then have the opportunity to make a more efficient
production plan. This means that the vendor’s unit production
cost can be decreased. Consequently, the vendor’s total profit
will be increased because of the reduction of its production
cost. On the other hand, to motivate the buyer to place orders
earlier, the vendor is willing to offer price discounts in which
the unit selling price is allowed to be decreased for long ordering lead time and/or large order quantity. As a consequence,
the buyer’s total cost will be decreased because of the decrease
in unit purchasing price offered by the vendor. According to
the above discussion and based on the work of Huang [17],
this paper developed a coordination model that incorporates
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the vendor’s pricing policy, the buyer’s ordering lead time and
imperfect product quality. In this model we investigated the
effects of both the vendor’s pricing policy and the buyer’s
ordering lead time on the supply chain system benefit. We
showed that both parties can benefit and the supply chain
system benefit can be optimized through coordination.

II. NOTATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
We adopted the notations and assumptions used by Huang
[17] to develop the proposed coordination model as follows.
Notations:
D
known annual demand
F
transportation cost per shipment
I
buyer’s inventory holding cost as percentage of
its unit purchasing cost
M
production rate, in which M > D
setup cost per production run for the vendor
SV
SB
ordering cost for the buyer
hV
unit stock-holding cost per item per year for the
vendor
hB
unit stock-holding cost per item per year for the
buyer
P0
unit purchasing cost for the buyer with zero ordering lead time
C0
unit production cost for the vendor with zero
ordering lead time
d
unit screening cost
x
screening rate
r
the coefficient of inflection for vendor
v
the vendor’s unit warranty cost of defective items
z
the coefficient of inflection for buyer
α
the parameter of production cost reduction rate
β
the parameter of price discount rate
Y
percentage of defective items, a random variable
f (y)
probability density function of Y
P(T)
unit purchasing cost for the buyer if ordering lead
time is T
C(T)
unit production cost for the vendor if ordering
lead time is T
RB(T)
unit risk cost for buyer if ordering lead time is T
RV(T)
unit risk cost for vendor if ordering lead time is T
Decision variables:
Q
the size of each shipment from the vendor to the
buyer
T
ordering lead time for the buyer
n
the total number of shipments per lot from the
vendor to the buyer
CB
the total cost for the buyer
πV
the total profit for the buyer
the expected total cost for the buyer
E[TCB]
E TCBold  the buyer’s expected total cost without purchas-

E TCBnew 

E[πV]
∆πV
∆CB
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ing discount
the buyer’s expected total cost with purchasing
discount
the expected total profit for the vendor
net increase of profit for the vendor, in which
∆πV = E π Vnew  − E π Vold 
net decrease of cost for the buyer, in which ∆CB =
E CBold  − E CBnew 

Assumptions:
(1) the system consists of a single vendor and a single buyer.
(2) demand for the single product is constant over an infinite
time horizon.
(3) production rate is uniform and finite.
(4) successive deliveries are scheduled so that shipments
arrive at the buyer when its stock from previous shipment
has just been used up; that is, the buyer places an order at
each cycle and the supplier delivers these items using
lot-splitting shipments.
(5) shortages are not allowed.
(6) number of perfect units is at least equal to the demand
during the screening time.
(7) the vendor delivers defective items in a single batch at the
end of the buyer’s 100% screening process.

III. THE MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING
MODEL
In this section, we first derived the vendor’s and the buyer’s
annual total costs, and then formulated a mathematical programming model for the supply chain system considered.
According to Huang’s work [17], the ultimate form of JIT
purchasing should be adopted to minimize the total cost by
implementing frequent deliveries in small lots based on a
vendor-buyer long-term agreement. Therefore, the vendor’s
annual total cost (including setup cost, holding cost, and
warranty cost for defective products) is given by
TCV ( n, Q ) =

SV D
vDY
+
n (1 − Y ) Q (1 − Y )

 Q ( n − 2) Q 
D
+ +
 1 −
−
2
2
1
Y )M
(




  hV
 

(1)

Also, the buyer’s annual total cost (including ordering cost,
holding cost, and transportation and screening cost) is given
by
TCB ( n, Q ) =

SB D
FD
dD
+
+
n (1 − Y ) Q (1 − Y ) Q (1 − Y )

 Q (1 − Y )
DQY 
+
+
 hB
2
x (1 − Y ) 


(2)
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In the proposed model, the buyer is allowed to determine its
ordering lead time T, and the vendor will be beneficial if ordering lead time is long enough for the vendor to make production plan more efficiently. The effect of ordering lead time
is reflected in the model by the vendor’s unit production cost
C(T), which is assumed to decrease as ordering lead time
increases. Meanwhile, the vendor is willing to offer price
discounts in order to motivate the buyer to provide longer
ordering lead time. The pricing policy effect is reflected in the
model by the buyer’s unit purchasing price P(T), which is
assumed to decrease as ordering lead time increases. Although both the vendor and the buyer can be beneficial due to
the reduction of production cost and purchasing cost respectively, the vendor’s profit may be decreased in the same time
because of its pricing policy. Furthermore, when ordering lead
time becomes longer, both the vendor and the buyer have to
take into consideration of the uncertainty of order cancellation
and delivery delay, respectively. In the proposed model, the
effect of uncertainty is reflected by the vendor’s unit risk cost
RV(T) and the buyer’s unit risk cost RB(T).
As stated above, the vendor’s and the buyer’s annual total
costs are modified as follows:
TCV ( n, Q, T ) =

SV D
vDY
+
n (1 − Y ) Q (1 − Y )

 Q ( n − 2) Q 
D
+ +
 1 −
2
 (1 − Y ) M
 2

(3)

 Q (1 − Y )
DQY 
+ IP (T ) 
+

x (1 − Y ) 
2


E [TCB ] =

  
  hV 
  

(6)

SB D
FD
1
1
1
+
+ dD
nQ E (1 − Y )  Q E (1 − Y ) 
E (1 − Y ) 
+ P (T ) D + zP0 RB (T ) D
 QE (1 − Y )  DQ  Y  
+ IP (T ) 
+
E

x
2
1 − Y  


(7)

Now, we are ready to formulate a mathematical programming model for the supply chain system considered. Let
E TCBold  and E π Vold  be the buyer’s expected annual total

buyer’s expected annual total cost and the vendor’s expected
annual total profit after coordination, respectively. Define
∆CB = E TCBold  − E TCBnew  and ∆πV = E πVnew  − E πVold  ,

Coordination Model

(4)

in which P(T)D is the buyer’s annual purchasing cost (or the
annual sales for the vendor) and C(T)D is the vendor’s annual
production cost. Note that holding cost hB is replaced by IP(T)
to reflect the influence of unit purchasing cost that depends on
the vendor’s policy
For simplicity, let TCV = TCV(n, Q, T) and TCB = TCB(n, Q,
T). Therefore, the vender’s annual total profit can be expressed as

π V = P (T ) D − TCV

  Q ( n − 2 ) Q 
1
D
−  +
1 −
2
 E (1 − Y ) M
  2

in which ∆CB is the net decrease in cost for the buyer and
∆πV is the net increase in profit for the vendor. The mathematical programming model for the problem considered can
then be formulated as follows:

SB D
FD
dD
TCB ( n, Q, T ) =
+
+
n (1 − Y ) Q (1 − Y ) Q (1 − Y )

+ P (T ) D + zP0 RB (T ) D


 Y 
+ vDE 
 + C (T ) D + rC0 RV (T ) D 
 (1 − Y ) 


cost and the vendor’s expected annual total profit before coordination, respectively; also let E TCBnew  and E π Vnew  be the


  hV
 

+C (T ) D + rC0 RV (T ) D

 S D
1
E [π V ] = P (T ) D −  V
 nQ E (1 − Y ) 

(5)

Since Y is a random variable with a known probability
density function f (y), the expected value of (4) and (5) are given
by

Maximize Z = ∆πV + ∆CB
subject to ∆CB = E TCBold  − E TCBnew  ≥ 0
∆πV = E π Vnew  − E π Vold  ≥ 0

(C1)
(C2)

As shown in the above coordination model, the objective is
to maximize the overall supply chain system benefit represented by the sum of the net increase in the vendor’s profit ∆πV
and the decrease in the buyer’s cost ∆CB. The constraints (C1)
and (C2) are given to ensure that both the vendor and the
buyer benefit through coordination, which simply says that the
vendor must have a non-negative net increase in profit and the
buyer must have a non-negative net decrease in cost. Note that,
although all individual costs in this paper are assumed to be
EOQ-based well-behaved functions, the resulting model is a
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general nonlinear programming (NLP) problem which is too
complicated to solve explicitly (in our experience it is quite
difficult even to investigate the behavior of the Hessian matrix
for the associated Lagrange function). Instead of using techniques for NLP problems to solve the general complicated
model, we solve in the following section the resulting model
using specific cost functions, and conduct sensitivity analysis
to illustrate the effect of the cost function parameters on supply chain system coordination in the problem considered.

1. An Illustrative Example

The derivation for the buyer’s expected annual total cost is
as follows. As defined above, let P0 be the unit purchasing
cost with T = 0 (i.e., without purchasing discount). The
buyer’s expected annual total cost without purchasing discount, E TCBold  , is given by
S D
FD
1
1
+ old
n Q E (1 − Y )  Q E (1 − Y ) 
B
old old

Similarly, the vendor’s expected annual total profit is derived as follows. Let C0 be the vendor’s unit production cost
with T = 0 (i.e., without cost saving). The vendor’s expected
annual total profit without cost savings, E π Vold  , is then
given by

  Q old ( n − 2 ) Q old
− 
+
2
  2


1
D
 1 −
1
E
−
Y
M
(
)


  
  hV  (10)
  

Assume that the vendor’s unit production cost is given by
C = C0 (1 − α T ) , and let the vendor’s unit risk cost function be
RV(T) = (eT – 1)/α. The vendor’s expected annual total profit
with cost savings, E π Vnew  , is then given by

 S D
1
E π Vnew  = P0 e − β T D −  newV new
 n Q E (1 − Y ) 

1
+ dD
+ P0 D
E (1 − Y ) 

 Q old E (1 − Y )  DQ old  Y  
+ IP0 
+
E

x
2
1 − Y  


Thus, the cost decrease for the buyer, ∆CB, through coordination is simply given by ∆CB = E TCBold  − E TCBnew  .

 S D

 Y 
1
E πVold  = P0 D −  oldV old
+ vDE 
 + C0 D 
 (1 − Y ) 
 n Q E (1 − Y ) 


IV. AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE AND
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

E TCBold  =
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(8)

Since the buyer’s unit purchasing cost is allowed to depend
on the vendor’s pricing policy, we assumed that the buyer’s
unit purchasing cost is given by P(T) = P0e–βT, which has been
utilized by many researches such as Nasri et al. [25], Kim et al.
[19], Paknejad et al. [28], Ouyang and Chang [26], and Chang
et al. [5]. We also assumed that the buyer’s unit risk cost
function is given by RB(T) = (eT – 1)/β. The buyer’s expected
annual total cost with purchasing discount, E TCBnew  , is then


 Y 
+ vDE 
 + C0 (1 − α T ) D 
 (1 − Y ) 


  Q new ( n − 2 ) Q new 
1
D
− 
+
1 −
2
  2
 E (1 − Y ) M
−

eT − 1

α

zC0 D

  
  hV 
  
(11)

given by

Thus, the vendor’s profit increase, ∆πV, through coordination is given by ∆π V = E π Vnew  − E π Vold  . In the remainder

E TCBnew  =

of this section, numerical results from the illustrative example
and sensitivity analysis of the cost function parameters are
given to show the effectiveness of the proposed model.

SB D
FD
1
1
+
n newQ new E (1 − Y )  Q new E (1 − Y ) 

2. Numerical Results

1
+ dD
+ P0 e − β T D
E (1 − Y ) 

To illustrate the proposed model, we considered an integrated production-inventory problem with modified data in
Huang [17], summarized as follows

 Q new E (1 − Y )  DQ new  Y  
+ IP0 e − β T 
+
E

x
2
1 − Y  


(e

T

+

− 1)

β

P0 rD

(9)

• production rate M = 160000 units/year
• demand rate D = 50000 units/year
• vendor’s setup and holding costs are SV = $300/cycle and
hV = $2/unit/year
• buyer’s ordering and holding cost are SB = $100/cycle and
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Table 2. The effect of α with β = 0.03.

Table 1. Comparison of results by the integration and the
coordination models.

Ordering quantity
Number of shipments
Cost for buyer
Cost for vendor
Total cost
Profit for vendor
Cost decrease for buyer
Profit increase for vendor
Total benefit for whole system
Ordering lead time

Integration
Coordination
model
model
780.268
790.48
7
7
$2530017
$2441354
$1537065
$1037564
$4067082
$3478918
$962935
$1060333
$88663
$97398
$186061
2.465

hB = $5/unit/year
• holding cost for vendor hV = $2/unit/month, holding cost for
buyer
• transportation cost F = $25/delivery
• screening rate x = 1752000 unit/year
• screening cost d = $0.5/unit
• warranty cost of imperfect quality items v = $30/unit
• percentage defective Y is uniformly distributed with probability density function given by f (y) = 25 for 0 ≤ y ≤ 0.04.
Also, parameters used in the coordination model include:

α = 0.08, β = 0.03, r = z = 0.0001, P0 = $50/unit, and C0 =
$30/unit. Computer software LINGO 8.0 is used to solve the
resulting coordination model.
Table 1 summarizes the numerical results obtained by
Huang’s integration model and by our proposed coordination
model. As shown in Table 1, both the vendor’s and the buyer’s
total costs obtained by the proposed coordination model are
better (i.e., less) than that of Huang’s integration model. The
vendor’s total profit obtained using the proposed coordination
model is also better (i.e., greater) than that of Huang’s integration model. That is, the numerical results showed that both
the vendor and the buyer benefit through coordination, in
which the vendor has a profit increase of $97398 and the buyer
has cost decrease of $88663 for buyer. The supply chain system achieves a maximum benefit of $186061. These results
are consistent with that of Zhao et al. [47].
3. Sensitivity Analysis of Cost Parameters α and β
In the numerical example, we used C (T ) = C0 (1 − α T ) and
P (T ) = P0 e − β T as the vendor’s unit production cost function
and the buyer’s unit purchasing cost function, respectively.
The parameter values α = 0.08 and β = 0.03 were chosen
arbitrarily to illustrate the coordination results. In this subsection we perform sensitivity analysis on parameters α and β
to investigate their effects on the vendor’s net profit increase,
the buyer’s net cost decrease, and the overall benefit of the
supply chain system.

α

T

Q

n

0.050
0.060
0.070
0.080
0.090
0.100

0.520
2.118
2.305
2.465
2.603
2.725

5744.7
789.1
789.8
790.5
791.0
791.5

1
7
7
7
7
7

Buyer’s
cost
decrease
22381
93082
91964
88664
83746
77590

Vendor’s
profit
increase
0
18418
55652
97398
142744
191124

System’s
overall
benefit
22381
111500
147616
186062
226510
268714

In the first part of the sensitivity analysis, we investigated
the effect of parameter α while β = 0.03 remains unchanged.
Recall that the vendor’s unit production cost function is assumed to be C (T ) = C0 (1 − α T ) , that is, the vendor’s unit
production cost decreases as α increases. However, in the
real world α cannot be reduced without bound due to the fixed
cost and other variable costs. As can be expected, the overall
benefit of the supply chain system will be better off if α increases and this is shown in the results in Table 2. In the table,
we see that ordering lead time elongates as α increases. The
overall benefit of the supply chain system increases from
$22,381 to $268,714 when α increases from 0.050 to 0.100.
Also shown in the table, we see that both the vendor and the
buyer benefit through coordination. There are two notable
interesting results: First, as seen in the first row of Table 2 in
which α = 0.050 and β = 0.003, only one side (i.e., the buyer)
gets the benefit. The associated solution is given by Q =
5744.7 and N = 1. This result agrees with the conclusions in
Huang [17]. In this situation, coordination may be broken at
any time because the vender does not share the benefit. Second, as shown in the table, if the total number of shipments per
lot from the vendor to the buyer are the same, the size of each
shipment increases as α increases.
The second part of sensitivity analysis is the investigation
of the parameter β effect while α = 0.08 remains unchanged.
Recall that the buyer’s unit purchasing cost function is assumed to be P(T) = P0e–βT, in which the buyer’s unit purchasing cost decreases as β increases. Similar results are
obtained as shown in Table 3. In the table we see that the
overall supply chain system benefit increases from $149,096
to $211,430 when β increases from 0.020 to 0.04, which
shows that both parties benefit because of coordination.
However, as β increases to 0.050, only one side (i.e., the
buyer) gets the benefit. The reason is that the vendor’s cost
savings (due to the shorter ordering lead time by the buyer)
are transferred to the buyer. The associated solution is given
by Q = 5968.9 and N = 1. In this situation, coordination
may be broken at any time because the vender does not share
the benefit. Note that as β increases, the total number of
shipments per lot from the vendor to the buyer decreases and
the size of each shipment from the vendor to the buyer increases.
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Table 3. The effect of β during α = 0.08.
β

T

Q

n

0.020
0.030
0.040
0.050

2.120
2.465
2.693
0.282

786.2
790.5
795.0
5968.9

7
7
7
1

Buyer’s
cost
decrease
12100
88663
169415
22184

Vendor’s
profit
increase
136995
97398
42015
0
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Table 5. The effect of Y with α = 0.08 and β = 0.03.
System’s
overall
benefit
149096
186062
211430
22184

U

T

Q

n

0.01
0.02
0.04
0.08
0.16

2.464739
2.464740
2.464741
2.464745
2.464752

782.2
784.9
790.5
802.0
826.7

7
7
7
7
7

Buyer’s
cost
decrease
88657
88659
88663
88674
88700

Vendor’s
profit
increase
97405
97403
97399
97390
97376

System’s
overall
benefit
186062
186062
186062
186064
186076

Table 4. The simultaneous effect of α and β.
α

β

T

Q

n

0.07
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.09

0.02
0.04
0.03
0.04
0.02

1.970
2.527
2.465
2.837
2.255

785.8
794.1
790.5
795.8
786.5

7
7
7
7
7

Buyer’s Vendor’s System’s
cost
profit
overall
decrease increase benefit
19515
97054 116569
168577
294 168871
88663
97399 186062
168018
88009 256027
3670 179924 183594

In the third part of the sensitivity analysis, we investigated
the effect of changing parameters α and β simultaneously.
Since both the vendor’s unit production cost and the buyer’s
unit purchasing cost decrease as α and β increases, similar
results are expected in that the overall system benefit will
increase when α and β increase. As shown in Table 4, we see
that both parties benefit through coordination. In the table we
use the case of α = 0.08 and β = 0.03 (shown in the fourth row
of the table) as comparison basis, and we observe two interesting results:
(i) As seen in the second row (the case of α = 0.07 and β =
0.02) and the fifth row (the case of α = 0.09 and β = 0.04)
of the table, the systems’ overall benefit decreases (or increases) when α and β increase (or decreases) simultaneously. In these cases, the benefits to both the vendor
and the buyer are reduced;
(ii) As shown in the third row (the case of α = 0.07 and β =
0.04) and the sixth row (the case of α = 0.09 and β = 0.02)
of the table, the system’s overall benefit decreases in both
cases. That is, either when α increases and β decreases
simultaneously or when α decreases and β increases simultaneously, the system’s overall benefit decreases.
4. Sensitivity Analysis of Defective Rate

In the last part of the sensitivity analysis, we explored the
effect of the defect rate on the optimal solution. Suppose that
the percentage defective random variable Y is uniformly distributed with probability density function given by
 1 , 0 ≤ y ≤ U
f ( y) =  U
0, otherwise.

To evaluate the defect rate effect on n*, Q*, and T*, we
examined different values of U ( 0.01 ≤ U ≤ 0.16 ). Table 5
shows the behaviors of the optimal solutions versus different
U. From the results, we can see that when U increases, the
values of T and Q increase; while n holds constant. Furthermore, as U increases, buyer’s reduction in cost increases;
while vendor’s increment in profit decreases. Thus, when the
defective rate increases, the vendor needs to deliver greater lot
size per shipment to satisfy the buyer demand. As the defect
rate increases, the system’s benefit increases simultaneously.
This result indicates the greater the number of defects, the
greater the importance of coordination for the vendor and
buyer. Obviously, the defect rate has low sensitivity to the
system’s overall benefit and for the ordering lead time.

V. CONCLUSION
This paper considered the issue of coordination for a simple
single-vendor, single-buyer supply chain system, in which the
buyer’s ordering lead time is affected by purchasing price
discounts which in turn are affected by the vendor’s pricing
policy. For practical purposes, risk costs and imperfect
product quality were also included. We proposed a mathematical programming model, called the coordination model, in
which the objective is to maximize the overall system benefit
and also guarantee that both parties benefit financially. From
the sensitivity analysis results for the illustrative numerical
example, based on the assumed but realistic cost functions, we
see that the maximum supply chain system benefit can be
achieved through coordination and both parties of the supply
chain system are beneficial. Future research includes an investigation into the effect of different cost functions, more
realistic and complicated inventory models to show that coordination is indeed a win-win policy for conflicting parties in
the supply chain system. The overall system benefits and the
individual parties in the supply chain system can achieve
further improved benefit through coordination.
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